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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This appeal concerns the allocation of authority between 
judicial and arbitral tribunals under the Railway Labor Act, 
45 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. The International Association of 
Continental Pilots (IACP) brought this action against 
Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") in the District 
Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a declaration 
and order directing that (1) Continental was required to 
arbitrate the merits of an issue assertedly raised in an 
employee's grievance, and (2) the grievance should be 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal on a class-wide basis. 
Continental counterclaimed, seeking an order directing that 
the arbitral tribunal determine the issues the IACP sought 
determination of by the district court. Thereafter 
Continental moved for judgment on the pleadings. That 
motion was granted and the case was dismissed. The IACP 
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has appealed the district court's order granting judgment 
on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
 
I. 
 
We rehearse the facts as set forth in IACP's complaint 
and brief on appeal. In 1992, after Continental filed its 
second petition for protection under Chapter 11 of the 
bankruptcy code, the airline froze, and then sought to 
reduce, the pay of its pilots. In response to the airline's 
announcement of its intent to reduce pilots' pay, a group of 
pilots undertook negotiations with the airline's 
management; these talks resulted in a written agreement, 
the "Cost Reduction Memorandum" ("CRM"). Paragraph 6(A) 
of the CRM made provision for the phased restoration, 
according to an agreed-upon formula, of any reduction in 
pilot pay: 
 
       The wage reductions (i.e. fuel bonus, line divisor, 
       training, per diem, and crew meals) . . . will be restored 
       progressively by Continental, in accordance with the 
       formula set forth in Attachment A, with full restoration 
       projected by July 1, 1993. As part of the restoration, 
       the program of quarterly fuel bonus payments to pilots 
       shall end, and in lieu thereof pilots rates of pay 
       progressively restored shall be . . . the April 1, 1992 
       rates of pay. 
 
Paragraph 6(B) of the CRM (the so-called "me-too" 
provision) provided that, until the pilots' pay was restored 
according to paragraph 6(A), if the airline granted a raise to 
any employee group other than the pilots, the pilots would 
receive a comparable wage increase: 
 
       Should Continental grant a wage or salary increase to 
       any employee group, including management and 
       executive employees, prior to restoration of pilot wage 
       reductions, then the company shall at the same time 
       restore pilot wages on a comparable basis. 
 
In late 1993, after the airline and the pilots' group entered 
into this agreement, the IACP was certified as the 
bargaining unit for the pilots. The CRM continued to be 
operative until Continental and the IACP executed their 
first collective bargaining agreement. 
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After the IACP was certified as the pilots' bargaining 
representative, the airline and the union entered into an 
agreement entitled the "Interim Grievance Procedure" 
("IGP") pending the completion of the parties'first collective 
bargaining agreement. In accordance with S 204 of the 
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. S 184, the IGP established a 
system board of adjustment ("System Board") for the 
arbitration of grievances.1 The grievance procedure 
contemplated by the IGP consisted of two preliminary 
stages--denominated as "Step I" and "Step II" hearings-- 
followed by appeal to the system board of adjustment of 
any grievance not resolved in the first two stages. 
 
On September 9, 1994--after implementation of the IGP 
but before the effective date of the first collective bargaining 
agreement--pilot Jackson Martin filed a grievance stating: 
 
       The Cost Reduction Memorandum establishes that fuel 
       bonus will be restored, it establishes a protocol for the 
       use of a higher hourly rate in lieu of quarterly fuel 
       bonus payments and it defines Continental's total 
       liability toward restoration of pilot wage reductions to 
       April 1, 1992 pay rates plus the value of the fuel bonus 
       program. Continental Airlines should honor the 
       Agreement it reached with its pilots under the Cost 
       Reduction Memorandum and fully restore pilot wage 
       reductions; to not do so would substantially alter the 
       letter and intent of the current Pilot Employment 
       Policy. 
 
Martin pursued his grievance, unsuccessfully, through the 
first two steps of the grievance procedure. On January 4, 
1995, Martin filed a notice of appeal to the System Board. 
On February 8, 1995, the IACP refiled Martin's appeal, 
stating "herewith is submitted the grievancefiled on behalf 
of Jackson Martin and all other similarly situated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 204 of the Railway Labor Act is among the amendments to the 
statute that extended its coverage to the airline industry. This provision 
declares that "it shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees, 
acting through their representatives . . . to establish a board of 
adjustment." 45 U.S.C. S 184. A "board of adjustment" so established is 
an arbitral tribunal to which the parties may refer any grievances that 
are not otherwise resolved. Id. 
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Continental Airlines pilots." The IACP's appeal formulated 
the question at issue as "whether the Company is in 
violation of the Cost Reduction Memorandum . . . and all 
related provisions for failure to properly enact pilot pay 
restoration rate effective July 1, 1994." 
 
Prior to the arbitration hearing, Continental took the 
position that (1) the IACP could not bring the appeal on 
behalf of similarly situated pilots, and (2) the System Board 
could not entertain the merits of any claim under 
paragraph 6(B) of the CRM (the "me too" provision) because 
Martin had not invoked this provision at the earlier stages 
of the grievance proceeding. When the arbitration hearing 
commenced, the IACP announced that it refused to proceed 
unless Continental agreed that any determination made by 
the arbitrator with respect to Martin's waiver of the "me 
too" provision or the IACP's right to raise claims for 
similarly situated pilots would be reviewable de novo by a 
federal court. When Continental refused to make this 
concession, the IACP voiced its intent to go to court to 
secure a judicial determination of the two issues. The 
arbitrator thereupon ended the hearing. 
 
The IACP brought suit in the district court, seeking an 
order (1) declaring that Continental was required to 
arbitrate the issue of whether the airline violated paragraph 
6(B) of the CRM, and (2) compelling Continental to accept 
the System Board's authority to resolve the paragraph 6(B) 
issue on a class-wide basis. Continental counterclaimed, 
seeking an order remanding for arbitration by the System 
Board the issues IACP sought to have the district court 
determine. Continental then moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, urging that the IACP's complaint sought judicial 
determination of issues that properly should be addressed 
by the System Board as part of its overall arbitration of the 
Martin grievance as recast by the IACP--the issues the 
IACP requested judicial determination of being whether the 
System Board should entertain the merits of a claim under 
paragraph 6(B) and whether any relief awarded pursuant to 
paragraph 6(B) should inure to all similarly situated pilots. 
In opposition to Continental's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the IACP urged that these were issues of 
"substantive arbitrability" for the court to decide in advance 
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of arbitration. The district court granted Continental's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating in its order 
that "[t]he case is dismissed." IACP then brought this 
appeal. Our review of the district court's decision is 
plenary. Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways Inc., 863 
F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
II. 
 
In order to bring the questions posed in this appeal into 
sharper focus, it may be useful to review the statutory 
setting within which these questions arise. The Railway 
Labor Act ("RLA") was enacted in 1926 to provide "a 
comprehensive framework for the resolution of labor 
disputes in the railroad industry." Atchison Topeka & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1987). Among 
the "[g]eneral purposes" of the legislation, as set forth in the 
1934 amendments to the statute, are "[t]o avoid any 
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier 
engaged therein" and "to provide for the prompt and orderly 
settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out 
of the interpretation or application of agreements covering 
rates of pay, rules or working conditions." Act of June 21, 
1934, ch. 691 S 2, 48 Stat. 1185, 1186-87 (codified at 45 
U.S.C. S 151a). To these ends, the legislation, as amended 
in 1934, required the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, 
denominated "the National Railroad Adjustment Board," for 
the resolution of such disputes, and authorized carriers 
and their employees to create "system, group, or regional 
boards" for the resolution of such controversies, provided 
that any party dissatisfied with the decision of a 
subordinate tribunal might still present the grievance to the 
National Board.2 RLA S 3, 45 U.S.C. S 153. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The RLA was the product of the joint efforts of labor and industry 
representatives, who drafted the legislation in an effort to correct the 
weaknesses of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, a statute 
which provided for the establishment of adjustment boards to hear 
disputes, but did not require the establishment of such boards nor 
render their awards judicially enforceable. See International Association 
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 (1961); Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor Act in the Era 
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In 1936, the RLA was amended to cover the infant airline 
industry. Act of April 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 
(codified at 45 U.S.C. S 181). As amended, all provisions of 
the RLA, save S 3, 45 U.S.C. S 153--the provision creating 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board--apply to airlines 
and their employees. 45 U.S.C. S 181. In so amending the 
statute, Congress deferred the issue of whether to establish 
a national adjustment board for the airline industry, and 
empowered the National Mediation Board ("NMB") to 
determine when the creation of such a board would be 
appropriate. 45 U.S.C. S 185. The NMB has not yet made 
such a determination. 
 
As amended, the RLA directs air carriers and their 
unions to establish arbitral tribunals--"system, group, or 
regional boards"--for the resolution of "disputes between an 
employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers by 
air growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or 
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or 
working conditions." 45 U.S.C. S 184. The statute requires 
that such a dispute "be handled in the usual manner up to 
and including the chief operating officer of the carrier 
designated to handle such disputes; but, in the event of 
failure to reach an adjustment in this manner, the dispute 
may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party 
to an appropriate adjustment board." Id. Consequently, 
until a national adjustment board is created for the airline 
industry, a decision rendered by a "system, group or 
regional board" is the terminal stop in the pre-judicial 
grievance process. Id. Once the appropriate adjustment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of Deregulation, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1485, 1498 (1990). The 1926 legislation 
made it the "duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees . 
. . 
to settle all disputes," and mandated the establishment of system boards 
for the resolution of disputes. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347 SS 2-3, 44 
Stat. 
577, 577-78 (1926). But when the requirements of the 1926 legislation 
proved to be easily evaded, further labor and management dissatisfaction 
with the process led to amendments in 1934, strengthening the dispute- 
resolution provisions of the statute. Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691 S 2, 
48 Stat. 1186. The history leading up to the 1934 amendments is 
recounted in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 
725-26 (1945). 
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board enters an award, its decision is enforceable in the 
federal courts, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. 
Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963), and is subject to 
narrow judicial review. Bower v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 
623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954). 
 
As the foregoing summary makes plain, the RLA's 
dispute-resolution machinery is central to the statutory 
scheme. As set forth in the statute, and elaborated by 
Supreme Court precedent, the RLA regime governs three 
different types of disputes: "representation disputes" 
(disputes concerning the selection of collective-bargaining 
representatives), "major disputes," and "minor disputes." 
Depending upon the type of dispute involved, the RLA 
regime imposes different procedural requirements on the 
parties and prescribes different dispute-resolution fora.3 
This appeal concerns "major disputes" and "minor 
disputes." 
 
Under the RLA, questions about whether a dispute is 
subject to arbitration are usually answered with reference 
to the distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes: 
"minor disputes" are resolved through arbitration (by the 
system boards in the case of the airline industry or by the 
National Railroad Adjustment Board in the railroad 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Representation disputes" are committed to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the National Mediation Board. 45 U.S.C. S 152 Ninth; Switchmen's 
Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 302 (1943). Major and 
minor disputes involve, respectively, efforts to secure and to implement 
contractual rights; these distinctions will be discussed more fully in the 
text. Further, it should be noted that certain of the rights and 
correlative 
obligations created by the RLA--particularly the provisions ensuring the 
free choice of bargaining representatives found in Section 2 of the 
statute, 45 U.S.C. S 152--are also enforceable in federal court. Because 
the RLA (unlike the National Labor Relations Act) has not established an 
administrative body for the enforcement of statutory rights, certain of 
the 
rights created by the statute are enforceable in the courts. See, e.g., 
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 544 (1937)(duty to 
negotiate judicially enforceable); Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. 
Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567 (1930)(right to free 
choice of bargaining representative judicially enforceable). Although a 
leading treatise on the RLA--The Railway Labor Act (Douglas Leslie, ed. 
1994)--refers, for analytic purposes, to disputes raising such issues as 
"statutory disputes," this label has not caught on in the courts. 
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industry) while "major disputes" are subject to a lengthy 
process of bargaining and mediation. 
 
The Supreme Court set forth the major/minor framework 
in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 
711 (1945).4 This classification scheme determines what 
kind of dispute resolution mechanisms may be brought to 
bear on the controversy and also determines the extent to 
which the federal courts may become involved. Association 
of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 
348 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
The "major dispute" category, as the Supreme Court 
explained in Burley, "relates to disputes over the formation 
of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They 
arise where there is no such agreement or where it is 
sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue 
is not whether an existing agreement controls the 
controversy." 325 U.S. at 723. If the parties are involved in 
a major dispute, they must bargain over the issue; while 
bargaining, the parties are required to maintain the status 
quo and exhaust the lengthy mediation procedures set forth 
in S 6 of the statute, 45 U.S.C. S 156, before they may 
resort to self-help. Compliance with these requirements is 
enforceable in the federal courts. Detroit & Toledo Shore 
Line Railroad v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 
149 (1969). If, upon the conclusion of the mediation 
procedures, the parties are at an impasse, they may then 
employ economic weapons (e.g., strikes or lockouts). See 
Burley, 325 U.S. at 725, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway 
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989). 
 
While the major dispute category concerns efforts to 
establish or change the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, the minor dispute category, in the Burley 
Court's formulation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The terms "major" and "minor" are not found within the RLA. The 
Supreme Court first used the major/minor typology in the Burley 
decision. In doing so, the Court adopted the nomenclature that had 
developed within the railroad industry. See 325 U.S. at 723-28. As the 
Court later clarified in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989), the designations "major" 
and "minor" are not to be understood as reflecting the relative 
importance of particular labor controversies. 
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       contemplates the existence of a collective bargaining 
       agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a 
       situation in which no effort is made to bring about a 
       formal change in terms or to create a new one. The 
       dispute relates either to the meaning or proper 
       application of a particular provision with reference to a 
       specific situation or to an omitted case. . . . . [T]he 
       claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones 
       created for the future. 
 
325 U.S. at 723. Minor disputes are subject to mandatory 
arbitration by the relevant board of adjustment, and may 
not be the subject matter of strikes and lockouts. 
Jurisdiction to entertain the merits of a minor dispute rests 
exclusively with the arbitral forum: "Congress considered it 
essential to keep these so-called `minor' disputes within the 
Adjustment Board and out of the courts." Union-Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978)(per 
curiam). 
 
Although the Burley Court established the general 
contours of the distinction between major and minor 
disputes, it did not articulate a standard for differentiating 
the two. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Association, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) ("Conrail"), the 
Court undertook to advance the analysis. "[T]he line drawn 
in Burley," said the Conrail Court, "looks to whether a claim 
has been made that the terms of an existing agreement 
either establish or refute the presence of a right to take the 
disputed action. The distinguishing feature of [a minor 
dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by 
interpreting the existing agreement." Id. at 305. Accordingly 
the Court adopted a standard that sought to synthesize the 
various verbal formulations adopted by the several courts of 
appeals that had addressed the issue: "Where an employer 
asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the 
ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified 
by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. 
Where, in contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or 
obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major." Id. at 307. 
 
III. 
 
In the case at bar, the district court determined that the 
"underlying issues in this case"--Continental's alleged 
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violations of paragraphs 6(A) and 6(B) of the CRM-- 
"constitute minor disputes under the RLA." Slip opinion at 
6. The district court then stated that "although the RLA 
requires that minor disputes be settled in arbitration rather 
than by strikes or by the federal courts, it does not prohibit 
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement from setting 
procedural limits to the system boards' jurisdiction. 
Whether the parties have complied with the procedural 
requirements of the collective bargaining agreement such 
that the arbitrator may address the merits of a dispute is 
a matter for the arbitrator to decide." Slip opinion at 8-9 
(citation omitted). The district court went on to conclude 
that the issues presented in the IACP's complaint "are 
minor disputes" which "must, therefore be decided through 
arbitration." Slip opinion at 9. 
 
There is no doubt that, as a general matter, a dispute 
over whether Continental violated paragraphs 6(A) and 6(B) 
of the CRM is a minor, rather than major, dispute. And, 
more particularly, there is no doubt that the issues posed 
by the grievance relating to pilot wages filed by Jackson 
Martin against Continental are issues of the sort that are 
subject to arbitration by the board of adjustment. This 
appeal focuses on the question whether the IACP's 
recasting of the Martin grievance into one of broader scope 
has introduced additional and antecedent issues that 
should be resolved judicially as a predicate to arbitration or 
whether those additional issues are themselves subject to 
arbitration. Characterizing these issues as matters of 
"substantive arbitrability," the IACP contends that they 
must be resolved by the district court rather than by the 
board of adjustment.5 In pressing this contention on 
appeal, the IACP argues that the issues that it asked the 
district court to resolve prior to arbitration--namely, 
whether the alleged violation of paragraph 6(B) of the CRM 
is properly before the arbitrator, and whether the 6(B) 
question must be addressed on a class-wide basis--are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On page 15 of its brief, the IACP attributes to the district court the 
statement that "the doctrine of substantive arbitrability has no 
application under the RLA." This language, however, appears neither on 
the page to which the IACP's brief refers nor anywhere else in the 
opinion. 
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questions of "substantive arbitrability" for the court to 
decide. 
 
The term "substantive arbitrability" derives from National 
Labor Relations Act jurisprudence but has been utilized in 
other contexts. It is used to describe the question whether 
the parties' dispute involves a subject matter that is within 
the ambit of a contractual arbitration agreement. See John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-58 
(1964); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). The Supreme 
Court used the term "substantive arbitrability" for the first 
time in John Wiley, a case arising under the NLRA, to 
differentiate "substantive" issues--whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute--from 
"procedural" issues--"whether grievance procedures or 
some part of them apply to a particular dispute, whether 
such procedures have been followed or excused, or whether 
the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to 
arbitrate." 376 U.S. at 557-58. The question of"substantive 
arbitrability"--that is, "whether a collective bargaining- 
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the 
particular grievance"--is, as the Supreme Court instructs, 
"undeniably an issue for judicial determination." AT & T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 
643, 649 (1986). Issues of "procedural arbitrability," on the 
other hand, are for the arbitrator to decide. John Wiley, 376 
U.S. at 558. 
 
Responding to the IACP's contention that its complaint 
implicates issues of "substantive arbitrability" for the court 
to decide, Continental makes two arguments: Thefirst 
argument is that, as the district court ruled, the IACP's 
complaint presents a minor dispute solely within the 
jurisdiction of the board of adjustment. The second 
argument is that the IACP's complaint raises questions not 
of "substantive arbitrability" but of "procedural 
arbitrability"--questions which are for the arbitrator to 
decide. 
 
A. Does Continental's Complaint Present a "Minor 
Dispute"? 
 
In urging the correctness of the district court's 
determination that the IACP's complaint presents a minor 
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dispute, Continental contends that the defenses that it 
advanced to the Martin grievance and to the IACP's 
proposed recasting of the grievance are defenses which, to 
use the terminology of Conrail--"[a] dispute is minor if the 
action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' 
collective-bargaining agreement"--are "arguably justified" 
by, respectively, the Cost Reduction Memorandum ("CRM") 
and the Interim Grievance Procedure ("IGP"). Thus, in 
Continental's view, we need look no further than the 
definition of a minor dispute to resolve this case. 
 
Although the Court's Conrail discussion of minor 
disputes is pertinent, we are called upon to answer a 
somewhat different question from that posed by the 
distinction between major and minor disputes. The function 
that a court performs when determining whether a dispute 
is major or minor is not the function that a court performs 
when deciding whether an issue is one of "substantive 
arbitrability" or "procedural arbitrability." As the Supreme 
Court has pointed out, the "arguably justified" standard 
announced in Conrail "was employed only for policing the 
line between major and minor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, 
Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 265 (1994). That line 
determines which statutory route must be followed as 
between (1) bargaining, followed by compulsory mediation 
procedures under the auspices of the National Mediation 
Board, which procedures are judicially enforceable, and (2) 
binding arbitration, subject to limited judicial review. Thus, 
the major/minor question allocates the respective authority 
of the National Mediation Board on the one hand, and the 
arbitral boards of adjustment on the other, and also 
delineates the judiciary's role in each respective statutory 
path.6 See Burley, 325 U.S. at 722. 
 
This appeal presents a related, but nonetheless different, 
question. It presents the question whether, in the 
adjudication of a dispute concededly to be decided by an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The definition of a minor dispute also comes into play when 
determining whether a state-law claim raised by a worker covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement governed by the RLA is preempted. See 
Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 265. But the preemption inquiry has no 
bearing on the case at bar. 
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arbitral tribunal (under the RLA, a board of adjustment), it 
is the arbitral tribunal or the court which determines the 
scope of the arbitration. To be more specific, a decision that 
the controversy about the adequacy of Continental's pilots' 
wages is a "minor" dispute sets the stage for a further 
question: Granted that Jackson Martin's grievance is 
arbitrable, are the additional issues posed by Continental's 
objections to the IACP's recasting of the Martin grievance 
matters to be decided by the district court or by the System 
Board? 
 
Hence this appeal concerns not whether this case goes to 
arbitration (as opposed to another statutory route), but 
instead concerns what issues the arbitral tribunal should 
decide and on whose behalf those issues are to be decided: 
the IACP's complaint asks the court to determine (1) 
whether the arbitral tribunal must, in entertaining Martin's 
grievance, decide whether or not Continental violated 
paragraph 6(B) of the CRM (the "me-too" provision), and (2) 
whether the arbitral tribunal must decide that issue on a 
class-wide basis. It is the IACP's contention that these 
questions fall under the rubric of "substantive arbitrability" 
and thus must be decided by the court. Because this 
contention is not definitively answered one way or another 
via the major/minor distinction, we now turn to the 
question whether the IACP's complaint involves issues of 
"substantive" or "procedural" arbitrability. 
 
B. Does the IACP's Complaint Raise Issues of 
"Substantive" or "Procedural" Arbitrability? 
 
In support of its argument that its complaint raises 
questions of "substantive arbitrability," the IACP relies 
heavily on our discussion in PaineWebber v. Hartmann, 921 
F.2d 507, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1990), and PaineWebber, Inc. v. 
Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir. 1993), two cases 
arising not under the RLA or the NLRA, but under the 
securities laws and the Federal Arbitration Act. In 
Hartmann and Hofmann, securities brokerage houses sued 
to enjoin the arbitration of customers' claims of fraud and 
mismanagement. Both cases concerned contractual 
language found in the arbitration provisions of the New 
York Stock Exchange rules and the National Association of 
Stock Dealers Code of Arbitration Procedure, to wit: "No 
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dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for 
submission to arbitration . . . where six (6) years have 
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act 
or dispute, claim or controversy." 921 F.2d at 509. Relying 
on the specific language, absent in the case at bar, relating 
to disputes "eligible for submission to arbitration," we held 
in Hartmann (and reiterated in Hofmann) that the 
application of the quoted provision was a question of 
"substantive arbitrability" for the court. 921 F.2d at 513; 
984 F.2d at 1379. In Hartmann, however, we specifically 
noted the narrowness of our holding, stating that 
"[l]anguage less distinct than `eligible for submission to 
arbitration' might well be insufficient to overcome the 
strong jurisprudential pull toward arbitration." 921 F.2d at 
514. 
 
The IACP urges that the agreement in this case--and in 
particular the exhaustion requirement of the IGP--presents 
a "substantive bar" to arbitration such that our rulings in 
Hartmann and Hofmann apply. The IACP places principal 
reliance on language in the "Jurisdiction" portion of Section 
III of the IGP. The language relied on provides: "The System 
Board shall have authority to hear only matters which are 
within the scope of this Agreement and which have been 
handled through the prior steps of this grievance 
procedure." This is not, however, the only part of the 
agreement which sets forth exhaustion principles. In 
Section IV of the IGP, under the heading "General 
Provisions," the agreement states in relevant part: 
 
       Unless the Company and the grievant or the IACP 
       mutually agree otherwise, a grievant is precluded from 
       raising in subsequent steps issues not raised in his 
       original grievance. Further, the Step II Hearing Officer 
       and System Board of Adjustment are precluded from 
       considering issues not raised in the grievant's original 
       grievance unless the Company and the grievant or the 
       IACP mutually agree otherwise. Such issues may only 
       be submitted as new grievances subject to all time 
       limits, jurisdictional restrictions, and any other 
       pertinent provisions of this Agreement. 
 
We do not find the language of Sections III and IV of the 
IGP to be as "distinct" as the language at issue in the 
 
                                15 
  
Hartmann and Hofmann cases. The mere fact that the 
exhaustion provisions are framed in obligatory terms does 
not necessarily render the provisions a "substantive bar" 
requiring judicial, rather than arbitral, interpretation. In 
Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 
1023 (11th Cir. 1982), a case we referred to in Hartmann, 
the arbitration portion of the agreement between the 
investor and the broker read, in pertinent part, "Arbitration 
must be commenced within one year after the cause of 
action accrued." Id. at 1026 n.4. The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that compliance with this provision was an issue 
for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 1028. Noting that the 
provision at issue in Belke presented a "stark contrast" with 
the NYSE and NASD's "eligib[ility] for submission to 
arbitration" formulation, we observed in Hartmann that the 
Belke court "quite reasonably" held that"its application 
should be decided by the arbitrator." 921 F.2d at 513-14. 
 
Even if the exhaustion provisions of the IGP could 
properly be read as approximating the distinctness of the 
Hartmann/Hofmann "eligible for submission to arbitration" 
provision, we would be slow to conclude that interpretation 
and application of the exhaustion provisions were matters 
for the district court rather than matters for the System 
Board. We think the case for judicial circumspection in 
defining the boundaries of the arbitral process is less 
compelling in the Hartmann/Hofmann setting, where the 
disputes to be addressed arise out of the relationship 
between a brokerage house and an individual customer, 
than in settings governed by a collective bargaining 
agreement which covers scores or hundreds or thousands 
or even tens of thousands of employees. In the collective 
bargaining setting, the primacy of the arbitral role is crucial 
to the stability of the work place. The Supreme Court made 
this plain almost forty years ago in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 
(1960): 
 
       Thus, the run of arbitration cases, illustrated by Wilko 
       v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 [a securities case], becomes 
       irrelevant to our problem. There the choice is between 
       the adjudication of cases or controversies in courts 
       with established procedures or even special statutory 
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       safeguards on the one hand and the settlement of them 
       in the more informal arbitration tribunal on the other. 
       In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for 
       litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for 
       industrial strife. . . . For arbitration of labor disputes 
       under collective bargaining agreements is part and 
       parcel of the collective bargaining process itself. 
 
Id. at 578. 
 
A recent illustration of the centrality of arbitration in the 
collective bargaining context is our decision in Association 
of Flight Attendants v. USAir, 960 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In Association of Flight Attendants, an RLA case, we were 
called upon to decide whether the district court erred in 
ruling that a particular item of evidence--the grievant's 
expunged criminal records--must be admitted in the 
arbitral proceeding. While finding that this issue could not 
correctly be characterized as presenting either a major or a 
minor dispute, we determined that the issue was one of 
procedure for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 348-49.7 
 
In so holding, we found guidance in John Wiley, which 
held that under the National Labor Relations Act, "[o]nce it 
is determined . . . that the parties have agreed to submit 
the subject matter of the dispute to arbitration, `procedural 
questions' which grow out of the dispute and bear on its 
final disposition should be left to the arbitrator." Id. at 557. 
Following the logic of John Wiley, we concluded in 
Association of Flight Attendants that the general subject 
matter of the dispute--i.e., the termination of the grievant-- 
was subject to arbitration and that the evidentiary question 
was one for the arbitrator to decide.8  960 F.2d 349-350. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It bears noting that we decided Association of Flight Attendants after 
Hartmann. 
 
8. The "procedural arbitrability" doctrine of John Wiley, long a mainstay 
of NLRA jurisprudence, has been held applicable to RLA cases by other 
courts of appeals as well. In Brotherhood [of] Railway Carmen v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 956 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1992), the court 
came to a conclusion similar to the one we reached in Association of 
Flight Attendants, albeit in a case arising in a different procedural 
posture. In that case, the union sued on the basis of an arbitral award 
entered in favor of a discharged employee by an RLA board of 
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In the case at bar, the IACP, in its first count for relief, 
asked the district court to rule that the arbitrator must 
determine the merits of the issue of whether Continental 
violated paragraph 6(B)--an issue which Continental 
contended, in advance of arbitration, was not previously 
raised in the grievance procedure. Thus the IACP requested 
a judicial determination of whether or not any applicable 
exhaustion requirement was met (and, if not, whether there 
was ground for excusing exhaustion). In doing so, IACP 
raised, in the RLA context, an argument which, in the 
NLRA context, the Supreme Court in John Wiley had 
occasion to reject. In John Wiley, the employer resisted 
arbitration of an employee's grievance on a number of 
grounds, one of which concerns us here: the employer's 
argument that the court should find arbitration precluded 
because the employee failed to exhaust the preliminary 
steps of the grievance procedure. 376 U.S. at 556 & n.11. 
Rejecting the employer's argument that it was for the court 
to decide the exhaustion issue (as well as the issue whether 
the grievance was timely instituted) the Court stated: 
 
       Doubt whether grievance procedures or some part of 
       them apply to a particular dispute, whether such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
adjustment. On appeal, the issue was whether the district court erred in 
ruling, in the first instance, that the employer "had waived its right to 
oppose the full award" because it failed to introduce the evidence that 
supported its opposition during arbitration. Id. at 158. The court held 
that the interpretation of the contractual provision relating to the 
manner in which grievances were to be presented to the arbitrators-- 
"each written submission shall be limited to the material submitted by 
the parties to the dispute [in the earlier stages of the grievance 
proceeding]"--was a procedural question for the arbitrators to decide. Id. 
at 158, 159. In doing so, the court pointed out that it is "customary for 
collective bargaining agreements to require the exhaustion of the 
preliminary stages of the grievance procedure before resorting to 
arbitration . . . for why establish remedies if the parties are free to 
bypass them?" Id. at 158. And in Larsen v. American Airlines, Inc., 313 
F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1963), the court noted "[W]here a labor agreement 
provides for arbitration or other internal resolution of disputes, this 
court has held that questions of `procedural arbitrability' are for the 
arbitrator" (citing Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d 
Cir. 1963), subsequently affirmed as John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)). 
 
                                18 
  
       procedures have been followed or excused, or whether 
       the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to 
       arbitrate cannot ordinarily be answered without 
       consideration of the merits of the dispute which is 
       presented for arbitration. . . . . It would be a curious 
       rule which required that intertwined issues of 
       "substance" and "procedure" growing out of a single 
       dispute and raising the same questions on the same 
       facts had to be carved up between two different 
       forums, one deciding after the other. Neither logic nor 
       considerations of policy compel such a result. 
 
376 U.S. at 557. We find this reasoning and result fully 
applicable to the case at bar. 
 
The second issue raised in IACP's complaint, whether the 
arbitrator must entertain the Martin grievance on behalf of 
all pilots, is likewise an issue for the arbitrator to decide. 
This issue is not only "procedural" in nature, but also 
requires considerable investigation into the meaning of the 
parties' agreements. The IACP in effect requests that the 
court certify the grievance as a class action before the 
arbitrator proceeds to hear the case, a proposed party- 
joinder ruling that would be "procedural" as that term is 
normally understood. Furthermore, resolving this issue 
would involve an analysis of the interplay between the 
CRM's wage-restoration provision--paragraph 6(A)--and the 
"me too" provision--paragraph 6(B)--on the one hand, and 
the IGP's provisions governing the conduct of grievance 
proceedings on the other. If we were to assume that an 
arbitrator would find any applicable exhaustion 
requirement satisfied, then the arbitrator might also find 
within the language of the parties' agreements, as 
elucidated by the law of the shop, a basis for considering 
paragraph 6(B) claims to mandate or permit class-wide 
relief (that is to say, perhaps the "me too" clause is better 
understood as an "us too" clause). But such a 
determination requires a much more searching 
interpretation of the contract than the courts are permitted 
under the RLA. In this case, as in John Wiley, this 
procedural issue cannot "be answered without 
consideration of the merits of the dispute which is 
presented for arbitration." 376 U.S. at 557. 
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The IACP seeks not a determination of the subject matter 
covered by the agreement to arbitrate, but a judicial 
determination of the parameters and scope of the award 
that the system board may permissibly enter, that is, (1) 
whether the "me-too" clause was properly invoked (and if 
not, whether the union can interpolate this claim at the 
arbitral stage), and (2) whether the arbitrator has authority 
to grant relief on a class-wide basis. In the latter regard, it 
bears noting that Section III.B of the IGP contains the 
following general grant of remedial authority (also under the 
subheading "Jurisdiction"): 
 
       The System Board shall have the authority to issue 
       rulings and make awards necessary to compensate a 
       pilot for actual damages suffered as a result of any 
       policy violations it finds to have occurred. The System 
       Board's jurisdiction to award damages is strictly 
       limited to actual, compensatory damages, and does not 
       include jurisdiction or authority to award damages in 
       the nature of a penalty, i.e., punitive damages. The 
       Board shall have the authority, however, to order a 
       party to comply with any provision(s) of the [agreement] 
       or policies as necessary to remedy or correct violations, 
       or to require specific enforcement of a provision of the 
       [agreement] or policies. 
 
The interpretation of such remedial provisions is a task for 
which arbitrators conversant with industry practice are 
likely to be better suited than judges. Cf. Carey v. General 
Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 508 (2d Cir. 1963)("We cannot 
divine now, nor do we deem it proper to predict, the precise 
form in which the arbitrator will frame his decree."), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964). 
 
When a court is called on to determine whether aspects 
of a dispute arising out of a collective bargaining agreement 
are to be determined by an arbitrator or by the court, 
judicial restraint is an institutional imperative. Excessive 
judicial intrusion can undermine arbitral expertise and 
authority.9 Further, lengthy court proceedings can seriously 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "It is particularly underscored that the arbitral process in collective 
bargaining presupposes that the parties wanted the informed judgment 
of an arbitrator, precisely for the reason that judges cannot provide it." 
Concurring Opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Harlan, 
JJ., in United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing 
Company, 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960). 
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undermine the capacity for prompt adjudication which is 
the hallmark of arbitration. As the Court cautioned in John 
Wiley, 
 
       the opportunities for deliberate delay and the 
       possibility of well-intentioned but no less serious delay 
       created by separation of the "procedural" and 
       "substantive" elements of a dispute are clear. . . . [S]uch 
       delay may entirely eliminate the prospect of a speedy 
       arbitrated settlement of the dispute, to the 
       disadvantage of the parties (who, in addition, will have 
       to bear increased costs) and contrary to the aims of 
       national labor policy. 
 
376 U.S. at 558.10 
 
Accordingly, both of the matters raised by the IACP's 
complaint are questions of procedure for the arbitral 
tribunal to decide. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. As pointed out in Part II of this opinion, supra note 1, the RLA's 
provisions for arbitration by boards of adjustment were drafted in 
response to the Transportation Act's ineffectual dispute-resolution 
machinery; but even those procedures established by the original statute 
proved less than satisfactory. Before the RLA's mechanisms for resolving 
grievance and contract-application disputes were strengthened by the 
1934 amendments to the statute, "parties were free at all times to go to 
court to settle [grievances]" and the intended dispute-resolution process 
broke down. Burley, 325 U.S. at 725-26. Consequently, the 1934 
amendments created a compulsory arbitration system"to remove the 
settlement of grievances from this stagnating process and bring them 
within a general and inclusive plan of decision." Id. at 728. Hence it is 
unsurprising that the 1934 amendments were enacted under the title: 
"An Act to amend the Railway Labor Act approved May 20, 1926, and to 
provide for the prompt disposition of disputes between carriers and their 
employees." Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, 44 Stat. 577. 
 
11. Continental concluded its brief on appeal with the recital that "the 
judgment [the judgment of the district court which granted Continental's 
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motion for judgment on the pleadings and recited that "[t]he case is 
dismissed"] should be affirmed." Continental has not asked this court to 
address the counterclaim it filed prior to moving for judgment on the 
pleadings. Whether that counterclaim has any continuing viability, or (as 
pointed out in the district court's memorandum opinion but not in the 
district court's order) vanished with the district court's grant of 
judgment 
on the pleadings and consequent dismissal of the case, is not a question 
that is before this court. If this matter reaches the System Board of 
Adjustment, we presume that the threshold issues before the Board will 
be those identified in Continental's counterclaim, e.g., whether, under 
the Interim Grievance Procedure, (1) the IACP may bring a grievance on 
behalf of "similarly situated" pilots other than the individual pilot who 
filed the grievance; (2) a grievant is precluded from raising before the 
System Board an issue not raised in the original grievance; and (3) 
Jackson Martin raised Paragraph 6(B) of the Cost Reduction 
Memorandum in his original grievance filed on September 9, 1994. 
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